CLASSIFICATION

S-E-C-R-E-T

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY

East Germany/Poland

DATE DISTR.

15 August 1955

SUBJECT

Notes on the Warsaw Conference

NO. OF PAGES

2

PLACE ACQUIRED NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

DATE OF INFO.

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

25X1

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, OF THE U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PRISON IS PROHIBITED. WITH THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

25X1

25X1

the GDR delegation which was to go to Warsaw had been picked works before
the beginning of the conference itself. By order of the Soviet Ambassador
in East Berlin, this delegation had to be reduced in size and persons who
were eliminated included Vincenz Mueller, Heinz Kessler, and Paul Verner,
as representatives of the KVP; Willi Saegebrecht of the State Planting
Commission; Georg Handke, Fritz Grosse, Peter Florin, and Reed Celegaer
as representatives of the Foreigh Ministry and the SED Central Committee;
Richard Staimer of the GST, and State Secretary Wollweber.



2. The Soviet Government modified its program for the solution of the German question and the further integration of the East Bloc states only one day prior to the beginning of the Warsaw conference. This modification came so unexpectedly that not even the Soviet Embassy in Best Berlin had been informed of it. The great reserve exercised by These Berlin had been occasion of their visit to Berlin on 8 May must be viewed in this light. These Soviet diplomats had tried to damp the exaggerated optimism of the SED leadership in the outcome of the Warsaw conference. It appears that the non-incorporation of the GDR in the defense system established in Warsaw was resolved upon in order to give the USSR a better bargaining position in the forthcoming four-power negotiations.



On 11 May, a preliminary discussion for the Warsaw conference took place under the leadership of Molotov. These discussions were attended by Ulbricht, Grotewohl, and Stoph and by the leaders of the satellite delegations. Molotov explained the modified Soviet attitude and the proposals made by his government. In his speech, the Soviet Foreign Minister stated that the ratification of the Paris agreements was bringing about a rapid reinforcement of Western aggressive forces. The new line taken by the Soviet Government was designed to stop this development and thus to avoid a further increase in international tensions. According to Molotov, this was the reason why the GDR was not militarily integrated into the Eastern Bloc system. The GDR was not allowed for the time being to form a national army. The SED was, however, to continue its propaganda campaign for the KVP and the GST. The USSR was willing to accept an invitation by the West for four-power negotiations and did not demand the scrapping of the Paris agreements prior to any negotiations on the German question. The Soviet disarmament proposal made on 10 May was to be the first point on the agenda of the forthcoming

CLASSIFICATION S.E.C.R.E.

STATE X NAVY X NSRB DISTRIBUTION ARMY X AII Approved For Release 2008/09/15 : CIA-RDP80-00810A007700010002-7

25X1

		•	٠.			
	SECRET	- U.S. OFFICIA	LS ONLY	المستعدد سدد الرياسة		
		The second second second second				
		0 .				. 2
	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	- 2 -				
	•	•				
four-power co	nference, nand	the solution of	the Germa	n question w	as to	• '
be coupled wi	th general disa	armament. The m	naintenance	of smaller	occupation	2
forces in Ger	many in accorde	ance with the S	Soviet peac	e plan of 10	May would	
create a favo	rable climate	or future negotiant that Germa	tlations.	worotov inte	nermore f armed	
said that the	that the	line h	ne recomiz	n a soacus c ed as defini	te. Until	' 6
the holding of	f free election	ns and the form	nation of a	n all-German	government	,
West Germany	and the GDR we:	re to be includ	led in an a	ll-European	security	
system and we	re to work for	a reunification	on of the c	ountry withi	n the	
framework of				•		
The result of	the Warsaw co	nference was di	sappointin	g for the GI	R and	
the SED and i	t is generally	believed to be	e a pol iti c	al defeat of	the GDR	
Government in	its relations	to the East Ge	rman popul	ation. The G	DR celegates	3
were criticiz	ed by the Pole	s and Czechs be	cause thei	r reports on	tne	
	East German r	earmament progr	ram were be	Tiesed to be	grossry	
exaggerated.			* ,			
	* .			٠,		
	•					
Com	ment: It shou	ld be remembere	d that Mole	otov is quote	d as having	
made, these sta	tements more th	han two norths	before the	four-power/c	onference	<u></u>
actually took	placemment i	16 markil	ples Monda	mobile and	an overes	20 V
			7 a F	The 18	mone than	
No anto	de as han	ing made to	area RU	accinence n		v
7		0	,		e e i se jako jo	
As in	The botone	the four.	former l	conference	actually	o
Josep "Wasa		<i>v</i> ·		0	Ø	• •
			• •		* *	
took fol	ace.					
				1 P - 1 T -		
	•			_		
A Committee of the comm	• *				and the state of t	
	* . *				•	
					•	2
والمقوال والمائد						4
	*					
				• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		
	1 2					
**************************************			•			
			• •	e urbaner e i		
	•		: 20			
وجيه هند آهند. مناسب				er i transporter († 1965) Protosofie		
			er e			
				-	•	
•						

Approved For Release 2008/09/15 : CIA-RDP80-00810A007700010002-7

•

	Approved For Release 2008/09/15 : CIA-RDP80-008	10A007700010002-7	25X
The state of the s	CLASSIFICATION C-E-C-R-E-C CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INFORMATION REPORT	REPORT	
COUNTRY	East Germany/Poland	DATE DISTR. 15 August	1955
SUBJECT	Notes on the Warsaw Conference	NO OF PAGES 2	
PLACE ACQUIRED		NO. OF ENCLS.	
DATE OF		SUPPLEMENT TO DEFORT NO	25X

THIS DOCUMENT CORTAINS HEFORE THE ATTORNOON OF ELEMENTS OF THE OWNER OWN

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

25X1

The GDH delegation which was to go to warsaw had been picked weeks before the beginning of the conference itself. By order of the Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin, this delegation had to be reduced in size and persons who were eliminated included Vincenz Mueller, Heinz Kesslor, and Paul Verner, as representatives of the KVP; Willi Saegebrecht of the tate Tlanning Commission; Georg Handke, Fritz Grosse, Peter Florin, and Fred Gelssner as representatives of the Foreign Ministry and the SED Central Committee; Richard Staimer of the GST, and State Secretary Wollweber.

- 2. The Soviet Government modified its regram for the colution of the Cerman question and the further integration of the East Bloc states only one day prior to the beginning of the Warsaw conference. This modification came so unexpectedly that not even the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin had been informed of it. The great reserve exercised by Zhukov and Pervukhin on occasion of their visit to Berlin on 8 May must be viewed in this light. These Soviet diplomats had tried to damp the exaggerated optimism of the SED leadership in the outcome of the Warsaw conference. It appears that the non-incorporation of the GDR in the defense system established in Warsaw was resolved upon in order to give the USSR a better bargaining position in the forthcoming four-power negotiations.
- On 11 May, a preliminary discussion for the Warsaw conference took place under the leadership of Molotov. These discussions were attended by Ulbricht. Grotewohl. and Stoph and by the leaders of the satellite delegations. Molotov explained the modified Soviet attitude and the proposals made by his government. In his speech, the Soviet Foreign Minister stated that the ratification of the Paris agreements was bringing about a rapid reinforcement of Western aggressive forces. The new line taken by the Soviet Government was designed to stop this development and thus to avoid a further increase in international tensions. According to Molotov, this was the reason why the GDR was not militarily integrated into the Eastern Bloc system. The GDR was not allowed for the time being to form a national army. The SED was, however, to continue its propaganda campaign for the KVP and the GST. The USSR was willing to accept an invitation by the West for four-power negotiations and did not demand the scrapping of the Paris agreements prior to any negotiations on the German question. The Soviet disarmament proposal made on 10 May was to be the first point on the agenda of the forthcoming

		C	LAS	SIFICATIO	11/4	S-F-C-R-F-T	
STATE	ж	NAVY	х	NSRB		DISTRIBUTION	
ARMY	ж	AIR	х	FBI			

25X1

	SECRET		
	- 2 -		25 X 1
be coupled forces in (create a fa said that t neutrality the holding West German system and	conference, and the solution of with general disarmament. The Germany in accordance with the avorable climate for future negative USSR would demand that Germand that the Oder-Neisse lines of free elections and the formy and the GDR were to be inclusive to work for a reunification of this system.	maintenance of smaller occ Soviet peace plan of 10 Ma otiations. Molotov further any be given a status of a be recognized as definite. mation of an all-German go ded in an all-European sec	upation y would more imed Until evernment,
the SED and Government were critic	of the Warsaw conference was d i it is generally believed to b in its relations to the East G cized by the Poles and Czechs b the East German rearmament prog 1.	e a political defeat of the erman population. The GDR ecause their reports on the	e GDR delegates
made these a actually to	Comment: It should be remembered statements more than two months ok place.	ed that Molotov is quoted a before the four-power conf	s having 25X1 erence
			25X1
			25/1

SECRET